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1 Introduction
Politicians are a target of violence in several countries around the world, especially in
some developing countries. Such violence is often perpetrated by criminal organizations.
For instance, in Mexico, assassins hired by drug cartels have killed almost 100 mayors
in the last decade.1 In 2002, a political organization with a criminal source of support,
the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), launched a campaign to
intimidate opposition political leaders in Colombia, which led to five murdered politicians
and the resignation of 222 out of 463 mayors (Dal Bo´, Dal Bo´, and Di Tella, 2006).
In Italy, 134 politicians were killed from 1974 to 2014 (Lo Moro et al., 2015).2 Thus,
investigating how and why criminal organizations use violence to influence politics is a
topic of interest in many countries.
Two complementary theories have been advanced to explain political violence under-
taken by organized crime. A first set of models focuses on the post-electoral bargaining
that takes place between criminals and politicians. Dal Bo´ and Di Tella (2003) and
Dal Bo´, Dal Bo´, and Di Tella (2006) suggest that once elections have taken place and
the winner takes office, criminal organizations can use threats to “induce a given policy
maker to change his action from that preferred by society to that preferred by the group”
(Dal Bo´ and Di Tella, 2003, p. 1128). In other words, criminal organizations use violence
after elections to influence policy making while politicians are in office. Organized crime
may, however, also use violence before an election in order to alter the electoral outcomes
and influence the political selection (Pinotti, 2012; Sberna and Olivieri, 2014; Alesina,
1www.nytimes.com/2016/01/17/opinion/sunday/why-cartels-are-killing-mexicos-mayors.
html?_r=2 (last accessed 18 June 2016).
2In 2015, the Italian Parliament undertook its first-ever survey of Italian politicians killed since 1975.
A parliamentary commission investigated the circumstances of all local politicians who suffered a violent
death, and presented the results in a detailed report including all main facts of each incident (Lo Moro
et al., 2015).
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Piccolo, and Pinotti, 2016). For instance, Alesina, Piccolo, and Pinotti (2016) find that
the homicide rate for politicians in Italy increases before national elections in regions with
a high level of organized crime. Like Pinotti (2012), they interpret this as evidence that
criminals want to discourage honest politicians from running for office.
In this paper we offer an empirical test of one assumption and two complementary
theories. The assumption is that criminal organizations use violence against politicians
largely to affect politics. The two theories are that criminal organizations strategically use
violence (1) before elections, to minimize the adverse selection of politicians or (2) after
elections, to minimize the moral hazard from politicians.3 Our test is based on a novel
dataset of attacks on Italian local politicians from 2010-2014.4 This dataset measures
attacks against politicians rather than general crime rates, as in the above-mentioned
studies. Our identification strategy exploits the specific design of the Italian city-level
elections, which take place at different points in time across cities, a feature that allows
us to (1) consider the effect on as many as 18 electoral cycles, even though we only have
data on four years of observations and (2) identify the electoral period excluding any effect
related to trend or seasonality by using monthly and yearly fixed effects. Therefore, we
study the probability of observing an attack with respect to the electoral cycle, which is
exogenously determined.
The results show that attacks on politicians in Italy remarkably increase immediately
after an election, but only in Southern Italian regions historically characterized by an
active presence of criminal organizations in the political arena (i.e., Calabria, Campania
3Note that there might be other moments in which to strategically approach politicians. However,
while the period around elections represents a clear, identifiable time frame, other attacks are likely to
occur based on context-specific events (e.g., before the approval of capital expenditures), which cannot
be systematically analyzed.
4We exclude data from 2012 for reasons explained in Section 4, which gives us only four years of
observations.
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and Sicilia).5 In such regions, we observe a peak of attacks in the month immediately
after local elections. The increase in the relative probability of observing an attack is
almost 10% (50% of a standard deviation). The fact that the attacks are only tied to the
electoral cycle in such areas provides strong evidence for the idea that such attacks are
not isolated events, but instead part of a strategy used by criminals to influence politics.
Such findings are line with Dal Bo´ and Di Tella (2003) and Dal Bo´, Dal Bo´, and Di Tella
(2006), as criminal organizations appear to strategically use violence immediately after a
new government is elected, and with Dell (2015), who finds an increase in drug-related
violence against Mexican mayors in the period immediately after the inauguration of their
government.6 In fact, right after elections important decisions are made, from official ap-
pointments to political programs, and there might be a high return, in terms of influence,
on conditioning politicians during this period. Additionally, criminal organizations might
incur reputation costs if the new government undertakes political actions explicitly in-
tended to harm the criminal organization. More generally, organized crime might want to
send signals about its strength and the risks associated with disobeying its will in order
to condition political decisions from the start of the term.7
Following this reasoning, criminals might be more likely to target first-time elected
governments, as they are less likely to have already been threatened by criminal organi-
zations. While local governments in their second term have most likely already bargained
5Note that our results are unaffected when we also include a fourth region that has more recently been
affected by organized crime, i.e., Puglia.
6In a similar vein, Hodler and Rohner (2012) observe that terrorist groups such as ETA and Hamas
historically used to strike right after an election took place. They model this empirical pattern as the
result of an incentive mechanism in which striking early in the electoral term allows the terrorists to
collect information on the ”type” of government they will have to deal with.
7A recent report of the Italian Parliament (Lo Moro et al., 2015) provides evidence of the motives
that might trigger violence against mayors and politicians at the city level (see next section). The report
devotes a section to electoral violence, pointing out that different episodes, from threatening letters
to severe threats, “show the existence of a very precise dynamic criminal organization interference in
determining political and administrative equilibria” (Lo Moro et al., 2015, 177).
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with organized crime during their previous term, newly elected politicians constitute new
agents with whom to negotiate. Indeed, this is what we observe: we find that previous
results are driven by elections in areas where organized crime is very visible, which led to
the appointment of a new local government. Those findings are robust to several robust-
ness tests, such as different definitions of the dependent variable and different measures
of organized crime’s spatial presence.8
Overall, this paper contributes to our understanding of the strategic behaviors crim-
inal organizations use to influence politics. The previous literature has discussed how
organized crime has manipulated the political selection process and electoral outcomes
in different countries. For instance, Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos (2013) show that
paramilitary groups in Colombia have significant effects on both elections and politicians’
behaviors when in office. De Feo and De Luca (2013) provide similar evidence for Italy,
showing that the Sicilian mafia has been able to obtain economic advantages for its elec-
toral support. In this light, Barone and Narciso (2011) show that city councils where
organized crime is more active are more likely to attract national funds. Moreover, crim-
inal organizations can affect political selection, discouraging high ability candidates from
entering in politics, as shown by Daniele (2015) and Daniele and Geys (2015). Finally, this
paper is also linked to the broader literature on pressure groups and lobbies. Lobbying
activities by organized groups peak during the electoral period (e.g., through campaign
contributions): this is investigated in several studies that model the behavior of lobbies
in the electoral context (Austen-Smith, 1987; Baron, 1994; Besley and Coate, 2001).
In the next section, we provide descriptive evidence of the ways in which organized
8A similar prediction could arise from the model of state-sponsored protection rackets developed by
Snyder and Duran-Martinez (2009). They suggest that the breakdown of state-sponsored protection
rackets can lead to increases in violence. In our case, the observed increase in political violence after
the election of a new government might reflect a coordination failure between mafia and local politicians
rather than bargaining (we thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight).
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crime influences politicians. In Sections 3 and 4, we present the empirical strategy used
to test the two theories mentioned above, the main results and some robustness tests. We
conclude in 6.
2 Local government in Italy
Italy is administratively divided into 20 regions, 110 provinces 9 and about 8,000 munic-
ipalities. The regions have general competencies in terms of occupational protection and
safety, education and scientific research, cultural heritage, sport, airports and harbors.
Before being abolished, provinces used to have specific competencies in terms of construc-
tion and maintenance of schools, roads and long-term planning in terms of environment
and waste management. Italian municipalities constitute the smallest autonomous ad-
ministrative unit in the country.
2.1 Competences of the municipal government
Municipal governments provide many basic civil functions, from keeping the Registry
Office to managing and providing social services, transport, welfare and public works.
Their responsibilities are mostly focused on local management facilities such as building
permits, and concessions of leases for water, sewage and waste management, which often
entail handling large amounts of resources.
According to Lo Moro et al. (2015), organized crime targets municipalities to obtain
contracts for waste management, quarries and other public procurements from which
high profits can be extracted by using low quality materials and cheap illegal labor. Mu-
nicipal governments also receive pressure for a variety of reasons, including requests for
employment for the city hall, housing, welfare subsidies. Finally, municipalities have
9Provinces were abolished in 2015.
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competencies in terms of prevention and control of money-laundering and racket in lo-
cal commercial activities and are directly responsible for the management of the assets
confiscated from the Mafia.
2.2 Municipal Elections
Municipal governments are headed by a mayor, an elected legislative body, the munic-
ipal council, and an executive body appointed by the mayor, the College of Aldermen.
The mayor and the council are elected every five years, but the electoral term can be
interrupted earlier if the mayor or more than half of the council resigns, or if the mafia
infiltrates the municipal government.10 In municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabi-
tants, elections take place in one round only; the candidate with the most votes becomes
mayor. In larger cities, mayors must obtain an absolute majority to be elected. If this is
not reached in the first round of the election, a second round takes place between the two
candidates who received the most votes. Finally, mayors can be elected for a maximum
of two consecutive terms, after which a change in government must take place. In our
analysis we consider electoral information about local elections in the period 2010-2014.
Such data are provided by the Italian Minister of Interior Affairs.11
2.3 The first steps of a municipal government
The inauguration of municipal governments happens within the first two months from
elections and some crucial decisions are taken within the first 45 days. The first step
is the proclamation of the Mayor, which coincides with the official proclamation of the
results of the elections by the electoral office. Within three days, the mayor announces
10Other reasons include: the inability of the mayor or more than half of the council to continue with
their activity due to permanent impediment, removal, appointment decay or death; violation of the
Italian Constitution or persistent violation of laws; and inability to approve the budget. See Articles 141,
143–146 of Legislative Decree N. 267/2000.
11http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php?tpel=G (last accessed 21 July 2016).
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the elected members of the Council which need to gather in the Council for the first time
within 10 days from their announcement. Within the announcement and before the first
Council, the mayor has to nominate the Aldermen and the Vice-Mayor. Within 20 days
from the inauguration, the mayor has to officially present the team of Aldermen and take
the oath on the constitution. Within 45 days from the proclamation, the mayor has to
present the government programme and nominate the representatives of the municipal
government in other local authorities and institutions.
3 How mafias influence politics
Overall, our knowledge of the strategies used by criminal organizations to influence politi-
cians is rather limited. We created a database detailing violence against politicians in Italy
from 2010–2014 to shed light on this phenomenon. The dataset includes victims’ identi-
ties and the types of attacks, which allows us to detect patterns in the timing and spatial
distribution of the attacks. Our database relies on four yearly reports published by Avviso
Pubblico, an Italian non-governmental organization (NGO)12 that systematically collects
local news and primary sources on threats and attacks directed at Italian local politicians
from 2010 on.13 Avviso Pubblico was founded in 1996 with the aim of “connecting and
organizing public administrators who are actively committed to promoting the notion of
democratic lawfulness in politics, public administration and on the local territories they
preside over.”14 On a daily basis, volunteers from AvvisoPubblico consult and register
12Note that official data about violence against politicians are not available.
13For the year 2012, information was collected expost using internet searches only, rather than daily
news consultation and first-hand information collection. As a result of this different methodology, only
47 attacks were recorded for this year – six times less than the yearly average. Due to the partiality of
these data and the difficulty of making meaningful comparisons with the rest of the data, we decided to
drop this year from the analysis.
14http://www.avvisopubblico.it/home/associazione/chi-siamo/about-us/ (last accessed 21
July 2016).
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news of attacks on Italian politicians and public officers at all levels of government that
appear in national or local newspapers or that are communicated to the NGO directly
through first-hand sources. These data demonstrate that violence targeted at politicians
is not sporadic. From 2010 to 2014 there were, on average, 277 attacks against Italian
politicians, ranging from a minimum of 220 in 2010 to a maximum of 328 in 2013. In the
following section, we will discuss the specifics of these attacks.
3.1 Different types of violence: from threatening letters to homi-
cides
From 2010–2014, the most common types of attacks were arson (targeting cars and the
City Hall or its structures) and threatening letters, which together constituted two-thirds
of the total. This pattern is similar across high and low organized crime areas, as well as
across different categories of politicians. Physical attacks and arson of politicians’ houses
also happened in a relevant number of cases, 67 and 50 times, respectively, in our four
years of observation. Other types of attacks happened less often, including bombings of
politicians’ houses and City Hall (34 cases) and homicides (two cases; see Figure 1 for the
full list). The use of homicide to stop the activity of a particularly hostile politician, and
to intimidate others like him, is likely to be particularly costly for criminal organizations
due to the state’s mobilization to persecute the instigators of the attack . From 1974 to
2016 criminal organizations were responsible for a total of 62 homicides (Lo Moro et al.,
2015), an average of 1.5 per year, much less than any other category of attacks observed
in our data. Therefore we test the hypothesis that a recurrent strategy is to escalate
the use of violence. When the same victim is attacked more than once, attacks could
escalate from less severe to more severe attacks.15 This hypothesis is not supported in our
15To test this hypothesis, we classified attacks as of low severity when they consisted of a threat such
as letters or verbal menaces; as medium severity when they consisted of a symbolic attack involving
9
Figure 1: Types of attacks against politicians, 2010–2014
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Note: The histogram shows the number of attacks targeting Italian politicians from 2010–2014 in each
category. The total number of attacks was 1,111.
database: out of 22 mayors who were targeted in more than one attack, a more violent
act followed a less serious one in only four cases. In all other cases, the seriousness of the
attack remained the same or decreased.
damage such as killing domestic animals, damaging City Hall or sending animals’ heads in boxes; and
of high severity when they involved violence – e.g., bombings, shootings, arson, physical aggression and
homicides.
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3.2 Geographic distribution: more violence where crime is or-
ganized
As many as 80% of the attacks took place in the south of Italy, particularly in the regions
most affected by organized crime. Of the 20 Italian regions, 57% of the attacks took
place in the three in which mafias were born and have been historically more active,
Sicily, Calabria and Campania. The other two regions that report above-average levels of
political violence are Puglia, where a fourth, more recent criminal organization is active,
and Sardinia.16 This pattern supports the idea that the attacks reported in this database
were for the most part organized and executed by criminal organizations. Figure 2 plots
the distribution of attacks by region.
3.3 Targets of violence: municipal-level politicians
Mayors are the victims in 28% of the attacks in our dataset. Town councilors and alder-
men are also at high risk: 13% and 10% of the attacks are directed at them, respectively.
Policemen and managers of the Public Administration and other public facilities (in Fig-
ure 3, they are grouped in the category Other) constitute another 16% of the attacks (See
Figure 3 for full list). While the fact that most of the attacks are directed at mayors is
consistent with targeting the most visible and prominent local politician, it is interesting
that national politicians never appear in our data as targets of attacks, which seems to
suggest that using violence against national politicians is not considered a cost-effective
strategy. This might be due to the higher levels of protection offered to national politicians
and their greater public exposure, which might entail more severe consequences in terms
of state mobilization against mafias after an attack. While we cannot draw conclusions
16Lo Moro et al. (2015) explain the high levels of violence in Sardinia as “a phenomenon that should
be placed in a larger context of ‘archaic’ behaviors, characterized by a culture of revenge and retaliation,
which does not recognize in the state the capacity to properly and promptly administer justice” (Lo Moro
et al., 2015, 96).
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Figure 2: Heatmap of attacks by Italian
Region 2010–2014
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Figure 3: Victims of the attacks, 2010–2014
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about the reasons why this happens, our data strongly suggest that violence is a strategy
mostly used against municipal-level politicians.
3.4 Timing of the attacks: election period?
In the four years studied, the number of attacks directed at politicians has been growing.
However, the succession of threats and violence did not follow a linear within-year trend.
The highest peaks were usually reported in May, which is when most local elections take
place. In Figure 4 we overlapped the timing of elections and the number of attacks per
month, using different shades of grey for months with elections taking place in 1 to 10,
10 to 60, and 60 or more cities. From Figure 4 we can see that there seem to be peak
around election periods, suggesting a correlation between municipal elections and attacks.
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However, there are two possible confounding factors. First, this figure does not allow us
to disentangle whether attacks took place right before or right after elections, a difference
that is meaningful for our analysis. Second, this correlation could be due to the seasonality
of attacks that, for some other reason than elections, might peak during election periods.
So far we have provided descriptive evidence on which types of attacks are used against
politicians, who are the victims, where and when they take place. The last (and most in-
teresting) question is why. Our main analysis will provide a causal answer to this question,
testing two different theories that link the strategic timing with the reasons underlying
the attack. The first, advanced by Dal Bo´ and Di Tella (2003) and Dal Bo´, Dal Bo´, and
Di Tella (2006) for criminal organizations and by Hodler and Rohner (2012) in the context
of terrorism, suggests that violence is used after elections to discourage politicians from
opposing illegal interest groups. The second, proposed by Pinotti (2012), Sberna and
Olivieri (2014), and Alesina, Piccolo, and Pinotti (2016), suggests that criminal organi-
zations use an escalation in violence before elections to influence the electoral outcome.
In the next two sections, we will explain the empirical strategy of this test and show the
results.
4 Empirical strategy
We create a 30-day-period panel of all the cities that experienced at least one attack
at any point in time between 2010 and 2014 during the 12 months up to (or on) an
election day. Each 30-day period is calculated starting from the day of the election, so
that periods do not correspond precisely to months of the year. Note that restricting the
period of observation to the 12 months before/after elections and considering only cities-
13
Figure 4: Timeline of attacks and elections, 2010–32014
Note: The figure shows the trend of attacks in relation to election periods. The dots indicate the number
of attacks in each month and the vertical lines the occurrence of elections. Darker shades of grey indicate
that more elections take place during that period (in order of darkness: 60 or more; 10–60; 10 or less).
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cycle observations in which more than 50% of the periods are available 17, substantially
reduces the number of valuable attacks for our analysis (N=421). This section discusses
three different issues that we should be concerned about when using these data for the
analyses.
4.1 Measurement error in the dependent variable
First, we might be concerned that our dependent variable is affected by measurement
error. Indeed, we cannot be sure that all the attacks reported are carried out by orga-
nized crime groups, as these events are rarely brought to trial. Measurement error in
the dependent variable does not introduce any bias into the estimates, but might inflate
standard errors, thus reducing the power of our statistical test. Three facts are worth
noting in this regard. First, even if we account for the possibility that random attacks
are reducing our statistical power, if we still observe a systematic increase in attacks dur-
ing the electoral period, this would constitute initial evidence that attacks on politicians
are performed strategically, and not at random times due to private (i.e., non-political)
motives. Second, if criminal organizations are indeed the perpetrators and sponsors of
the intimidation, we should observe a greater increase in attacks in areas where criminal
organizations are more active. We test this hypothesis using different measures of orga-
nized crime presence in an area.18 Third, the parliamentary report mentioned above (Lo
Moro et al., 2015), which documents the connection between attacks against politicians
17The reason why some periods might be unavailable is because they might fall into years for which
we do not have crime observations. For example, for a city with elections in May 2010, the period t− 5
(150 days before elections) corresponds to December 2009, for which we do not have data on attacks.
18One might be concerned that attacks committed by mentally ill people might increase close to elec-
tions as a function of politicians’ higher visibility during this period. The peak in violence that we observe
in mafia-affected areas might also be interpreted as the product of a general culture of violence affecting
these particular areas. Still, in this case we would expect attacks to mostly take place during the electoral
campaign, in the period of politicians’ higher visibility before elections. Instead, as shown in Section 5,
we observe a peak in attacks in mafia-affected areas after elections have taken place.
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and organized crime using both public and restricted-access data, estimates that attacks
driven by personal motives constitute a very small fraction of the total. In particular,
”Data provided by the Prefectures show that less than 8% of the acts of intim-
idation to which a motivation could be attributed refers to personal motives,
private disputes that fall outside of the political and administrative engage-
ment of the victim and 3% have vandalistic nature” (Lo Moro et al., 2015,
178).
4.2 Addressing selection bias
An additional concern is that the media is our primary data source, which causes two
potential problems. First, we might be capturing only the effect on the population of
politicians who decide to denounce an attack. Second, and most importantly, we might
be capturing an increase in attacks around elections only because the media talk about
attacks on politicians during periods when politics is more salient. Media under-reporting
is probably not a real concern, as attacks against politicians are uncommon events in most
cities. However, we address both issues by performing a robustness test on a restricted
sample containing only the most visible attacks –those that can be seen by people other
than the victim and, thus, are likely not to be hidden. In this test we exclude all types
of threatening letters and menaces and include, for example, arson against City Hall,
shootings at politicians’ houses, bombings and homicides.19 Such attacks are visible, and
thus the politician is not in the position of deciding whether or not to report them to
the police, and the local media would cover the news even far from the election period.
19Other visible attacks include arson of a politician’s car or house, physical aggression, robberies of
and damage to City Hall, and shootings of a politician’s car. We define attacks as not necessarily visible
when they consist of threatening letters, verbal or telephone threats, bullets left in front of a politician’s
house, felling trees on private property, sending dead animals to a politician, or killing his or her domestic
animal.
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Finally, if media salience is driving the peak in attacks around elections, we should observe
an increase right before elections take place. Instead, no significant variation in attacks
happens before election day.
4.3 Identification strategy
To identify the effect of the electoral cycle, we exploit the specific design of Italian local
elections, which are distributed on a rolling basis in a five-year cycle across cities (Figure
4). Elections happen in March, April, May, June, October and November each year.20
This particular feature gives us two advantages. First, even though our database consists
of only four years, we observe 18 electoral-period observations, which allows us to draw
meaningful conclusions about attacks’ recurrence within electoral cycles. Second, and
most importantly, the panel structure of our data combined with the exogenous variation
in the electoral periods allows us to isolate the effect of the electoral period from any time-
specific effect – trends and seasonality of the attacks – which might be the actual driver of
the results. Additionally, using municipal-level fixed effects accounts for any city-specific
factor. In other words, our identification strategy resembles a difference-in-differences
framework in which we observe each city’s outcome before and after the treatment (i.e., a
municipal election), where the assignment to the treatment (i.e., the timing of elections)
is independent of both attacks and the actors involved. The baseline specification is a
regression of the following form:
Yit =α +
+n∑
t=−n
βitXit +
+n∑
t=−n
γitXit ∗Mafiai
+ θi +
12∑
m=1
1{Month = m}+
2014∑
z=2010
1{Y ear = z}+ it
(1)
20For cities above 15000 inhabitants, we consider - if available - the date of the second round of elections
(see Section 2.2).
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Our dependent variable is the number of attacks in municipality i and period t. How-
ever, as there are very few cases of more than one attack in the same month within the
same city (less than 1%, with a maximum number of five attacks), we transform this
variable into a dummy taking a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if (at least) one attack takes
place. In our main results, we use all reported attacks as the dependent variable. In a
robustness test, we report our results using visible attacks as the dependent variable, as
they are less likely to be affected by measurement error (see Section 4.2). The number of
attacks in municipality i and period t is a function of a vector of dummies X – one for
each 30-day period before (Xt<0) and after (Xt>0) election day. For example, if in city i
elections take place on 5 May 2013, the dummy Xit=−1 takes a value of 1 from 4 April
2013 to 4 May 2013 and 0 otherwise, the dummy Xit=−2 takes a value of 1 from 4 March
to 4 April and 0 otherwise, and so on until t = n.
This methodology represents a significant improvement in the correct identification
of the effect of the electoral cycle. Several studies (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004;
Brender and Drazen, 2005; Shi and Svensson, 2006) pointed to the problems of poor
identification resulting from not disentangling pre- and post-electoral periods properly. If
elections occur on 2 February, for example, most of the election month represents the post-
electoral period. However, many studies consider the entire month – or even the entire
year – as the pre-electoral period. In an attempt to overcome this issue, Shi and Svensson
(2006) propose to run robustness tests to check that the results are not driven by early or
late elections. Franzese and Robert (2000) suggest to weight the yearly dummy for pre-
or post-election by the share of the year that occurs before or after elections. Cazals and
Sauquet (2015) estimate a Cox proportional hazard model. By calculating dummies that
correspond to 30-day periods before and after the election in each municipality and year,
we overcome poor identification issues and precisely define periods in the electoral cycle.
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For each election in each city, we consider a time window of 24 periods of 30 days
around the electoral date, 12 ”months” before and 12 after election day. We chose a
window of 12 months because we want to consider a period long enough to test whether
(1) there are multiple, random peaks at different points in time or (2) there is significant
variation only around elections, as we hypothesize.2122 Using a shorter or longer window,
however, does not affect our results. In the Appendix we replicate our main analysis using
a time window of six months (see Figure A.2).23 The set of period dummies allows us to
capture the effect of each election period on the probability that an attack will take place.
Note that in all specifications, the base omitted category is the first period, i.e., Xit=−12,
but changing the reference category to the period right before elections (Xit=−1) confirms
our result (see Table A2).24
The second term in the equation is the interaction of each of the period dummies with
the dummy Mafia, which takes a value of 1 in areas particularly affected by organized
21In the Appendix (Figure A.1), we show the distribution of attacks based on this timing definition,
where we can exactly measure the distance of each attack from the last local election. In line with Figure
4, we observe a peak during the electoral period. However, this figure shows that the peak - at least for
high crime areas - is reached immediately after the elections (t+1). Such descriptive evidence will be
confirmed by our findings in Section 5.
22Note that in order to observe up to 12 months before and after elections, we had to drop all electoral
cycles happening less than 720 days of distance from the other within the same city. As a result, we drop
15 electoral cycles (our results are unaffected by the inclusion of such observations). We consider only 24
periods because in many cities, elections happen more often than every 720 days, and we would have to
drop more observations in order to observe slightly longer periods. However, when replicating the analysis
using a longer period of observation, our main results hold. Moreover, a simpler specification would rely
on periods corresponding to actual months. For example, if elections in city i happen in May, we would
consider the effect of April, March, February, etc. on the probability of being a target of violence. Yet
this specification does not allow us to properly distinguish between pre- and post-electoral attacks that
take place during the month of the election, which is why we did not adopt it as our preferred option.
However, the results are very similar using this alternative strategy, both in size and significance (results
available upon request).
23Even though potentially we could recover the 15 city-cycle observations that we dropped due to
overlap, in practice the number of observations we consider remains the same. This is because, when we
consider only 6 months from election, all the observations that we dropped fall in a time period for which
we do not have attack data (i.e. 2009 or 2012).
24Note also that our results are unchanged if we drop all cities having earlier elections (See section 2.2).
This is important as in the case of earlier elections the electoral timing is not exogenously determined.
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crime. This term allows us to consider the differential effect of each period in cities
affected by high levels of organized crime. We assess the presence of criminal organizations
considering cities in regions that have historically been affected by this phenomenon, i.e.
Calabria, Campania and Sicilia. However, in Section 5, we also take into account other
three measures: i) cities where at least one firm was seized to organized crime;25 ii)
city councils dissolved for mafia infiltration;26 ii) an index for mafia presence (scored
from 0 to 100) at the provincial level (Calderoni, 2011). The index takes four measures
of mafia presence into account: the number of mafia homicides, the number of active
criminal organizations, the number of firms and houses seized by criminal organizations,
the number of city councils dissolved due to mafia presence in the council (for more
details, see Calderoni (2011)). The remaining terms in Equation 1 represent city, month
and year fixed effects. Due to the nature of our data, in which cities in the period taken
into account in the regression rarely experience more than one attack, serial correlation
of errors is not a concern. Finally, all standard errors are clustered at the city level.
5 Results
Figure 5 and Table 1 show the coefficients from estimating Equation 1, focusing on attacks
around a window of two periods from and to elections. In the top(bottom) of the figure,
we present the results from the estimation of Equation 1 where the dummy Mafia in
the interaction equals 0 (1). In other words, the top panel represents the effect of each
period on the probability that an attack will take place in a region with a low presence
of organized crime. The bottom panel represents the differential effects in areas with a
high presence of organized crime. Here the areas with high organized crime are defined as
25Firms can be seized to criminal groups since 1982 due to the Law Rognoni-La Torre N. 646, 1982.
26City councils can be dissolved for mafia infiltration since 1991 as regulated by Art. 143 of the Testo
Unico degli Enti Locali (D.Lgs. 267/2000).
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regions in which the three main Italian criminal organizations originated and are highly
active (Sicily, Campania and Calabria, e.g., Pinotti (2015)). Overall, we observe that the
coefficient for the period immediately following elections is the only one that is significantly
different from zero, and only in regions affected by high levels of organized crime (the only
exception is t + 10 in the bottom panel, which is significant at the 5% level). The peak
in the bottom panel of Figure 5 represents a 9-percentage-point relative surge in the
probability of attacks (Column 1 of Table 1), which is a sizable effect. This coecient
is also statistically dierent from the same coecient in areas with a low organized crime
presence (Column 1 of Table 1). The probability of being a target of violence remains
higher than average in the second period after elections, and slowly goes back to normal
after period t + 3. Note that in all tables, in order to preserve space, we report only the
coefficient of Xit=+1 (simply t+ 1 from now on) and its interacted terms.
Such results are in line with criminals exhibiting the strategic behavior of targeting
politicians during the electoral period – especially in the weeks immediately after the
election – in order to influence policy making from the start of their political term (Dal
Bo´ and Di Tella, 2003; Dal Bo´, Dal Bo´, and Di Tella, 2006). Following this reasoning,
we should also expect such strategic behavior to be more likely when a new incumbent
is elected, as this represents a potential new target for criminals. In Figure 6 and Ta-
ble 1 (Columns 2–4), we present the results of our test of this prediction. Specifically,
we estimate Equation 1 in two different sub-samples: elections that do not bring a new
local government to power (left-hand panels of Figure 6, Column 3), and those in which
the incumbent is re-elected (right-hand panels: Column 2; in Column 4, we report the
estimation of the entire sample). Since Italian mayors have a two-term limit, new govern-
ments come to power regularly in all types of cities. First, we observe no clear trends in
areas with a low mafia presence (bottom panels), except for a weakly significant decrease
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Figure 5: Probability of being a target of violence
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Note: The figure shows plotted coefficients from panel estimates where the dependent variable is a dummy
equal to 1 (0 otherwise) if there is at least one attack in city i in period t. We consider 30-day periods
from -12 to + 12 (12 months before and after the elections). Each variable is a dummy equal to 1 in the
respective period. High(Low) Organized Crime (here referred to as M) is a dummy equal to 1 only for
regions with high(low) criminal organization involvement in politics. The base category is the period -12
to election. The lines report 5% confidence intervals.
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in the period t+1.27 Second, cities in mafia-affected areas with a change in government
experience an increase in attacks on politicians around elections; this trend is clearly vis-
ible and has a stronger effect compared with previous results. Therefore, previous results
seem to be driven by attacks following changes in government in regions where criminal
organizations are politically active: criminals’ strategic behavior is also determined by
the electoral outcome, as a new incumbent seems to be a more likely target of attacks.
The same conclusions can be drawn from Table 1 (Columns 2–4).2829
5.1 Robustness tests
In this section, we present several robustness tests to provide additional evidence in favor
of our main findings.
5.1.1 Visible attacks
As explained in Section 4.2, we perform a robustness test on the group of visible attacks,
dropping those (e.g., threatening messages; see section 4.2 for the complete list) that can
be easily hidden and therefore under-reported. In Table A3 and Figure A.3, we report
such estimates. Using this subset, our previous findings are substantially confirmed as
we observe an approximately 12% higher probability of attacks in the month after an
election in areas with a high mafia presence, which is driven by cities changing their local
governments (Columns 2 to 4). Moreover, we also observe quite volatile coefficients in the
panels without governmental change. This is due to the small number of attacks within
27A decrease in violence in low-crime areas when a new government is appointed is consistent with
our theory. Attacks unaffiliated with organized crime tend to be a response to government institutions’
performance – which at this point would be unknown – and not, as in the case of organized crime, a
signal to the institutions intended to condition their future behavior.
28Note that attacks in the first weeks of the electoral term might still have a valence for political
selection, as they might lead to the resignation of the new elected government. Lo Moro et al. (2015)
document some cases of politicians resigning after being attacked. However, such resignations never take
place in the first months after the elections (we thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion).
29Results are substantially unchanged using a logistic model and are available upon request.
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Figure 6: Probability of being a target of violence, cities with and without change in
government
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Note: The figure shows plotted coefficients from panel estimates where the dependent variable is a dummy
equal to 1 (0 otherwise) if there is at least one attack in city i in period t. We consider 30-dayperiods
from -12 to + 12(12 months before and after the elections). Each variable is a dummy equal to 1 in
the respective period. High(Low) Organized Crime (here referred to as M) is a dummy equal to 1 only
for regions with high(low) criminal organization involvement in politics. The dummy change, for which
we subset the regression, takes a value of 1 only when the election led to the appointment of a new
government in city i. The base category is the period -12 to election. The lines report 5% confidence
intervals.
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Table 1: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entire Gov No Gov Entire
Sample Change Change Sample
t+1 -0.0305 -0.0645 0.0513 0.0506
(0.0278) (0.0340) (0.0452) (0.0373)
t+1*Mafia 0.0901*** 0.155*** -0.0421 -0.0376
(0.0329) (0.0477) (0.0438) (0.0434)
Gov.Change 0.110***
(0.0382)
t+1*Gov.Change -0.115***
(0.0400)
Mafia*Change -0.0115
(0.0456)
t+1*Mafia*Change 0.190***
(0.0640)
City FE YES YES YES YES
Month FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 7,965 5,184 2,781 7,965
R-squared 0.011 0.015 0.031 0.019
Number of cities-cycle 421 276 149 421
Note: The table shows the results from a panel analysis where the dependent
variable is a dummy equal to one (0 otherwise) if there is an attack in city i at
time t. t+1 is a dummy equal to 1 (0 otherwise) in the 30 days after the election
day. Gov.Change equal to 1 (0 otherwise) if a new mayor is elected. Mafia is a
dummy equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for cities in Sicilia, Campania and Calabria.
Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level (in brackets).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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such groups, especially in the case of low-crime areas – without a change in government –
which only experienced 49 attacks over the 24 observed periods. A similar pattern is also
found in robustness tests in which the sub-sample of attacks, in low-crime areas without
elections leading to a change in government, is very small.
5.1.2 Salient attacks
As outlined in Section 4, a limitation of our analysis is the fact that not all types of
attacks might be reported to the police and then published by the media. A possible
concern is that in regions with a relatively high mafia presence, news about attacks on
politicians might only be reported in the media during the electoral period. Therefore
the worry is that a peak in attacks observed before local elections may be simply due to
increased media scrutiny during this period. However, our results point to the presence
of a peak after elections. In Table A4 and Figure A.4, we replicate previous findings
excluding attacks that might be relatively less appealing for the media, i.e.,(i) attacks
on buildings30,(ii) attacks directed at city council members, which are less likely to be
newsworthy than attacks on the mayor and iii) attacks on politicians’ relatives, which
might be due to reasons unrelated to politics. Again, our results remain similar: we
observe a peak in attacks only in the month following the elections, driven by cities
experiencing a governmental change in high-mafia regions.
5.1.3 Alternative mafia measure
Although we define high organized crime areas as the three Italian regions where organized
crime has traditionally been politically active, mafia presence is very heterogeneous within
these regions. Therefore, we use three alternative measures that provide more granular
30Indeed, excluding attacks towards buildings test the robustness to using only the attacks that can be
linked beyond doubt to a specific politician.
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information on organized crime’s presence. The first is the presence in a city of firms that
have been seized from Mafias, presented in Table A5. Specifically, we code a dummy,
Seized Firms, equal to one (otherwise 0) if at least one firm was seized to the mafia in
the city. The second is whether the municipal government has ever been dissolved due to
Mafia infiltrations, tested in Table A6. In this case, we code a dummy, Dissolved, equal
to one (otherwise 0) if a local city council was dissolved by the central government for
ties between local politicians and organized crime. The third is a test based on the index
developed by Calderoni (2011), which measures mafia infiltration across Italian provinces
(Italy has 110 provinces, see Section 4.3 for more details about this index). In this test,
we replicate previous models considering the top five provinces in terms of presence of
organized crime (Figure A.5 and Table A7).31 Our previous findings are confirmed using
all these alternative measures of mafia presence. Note that when replicating the test
based on the Calderoni Index with different groups of provinces, e.g., top 10, top 15 and
top 20 in terms of organized crime presence, we do not find similar results, i.e., the peak
in the post-electoral period disappears (results available upon request). This suggests
that our findings are driven by the areas most affected by organized crime. Consistent
with our expectations, criminal organizations pursue their objectives and have the tools
to influence politicians only in areas where they are most powerful.
5.1.4 Political conflict
An alternative mechanism to explain our results might be that attacks are driven by
conflicts and rivalries among politicians.32 According to this logic, attacks might increase
31According to Calderoni (2011), the top five provinces for mafia infiltration are: Napoli, Reggio
Calabria, Vibo Valentia, Palermo and Caltanisetta. They are all located in three above mentioned
regions (Calabria, Campania and Sicilia).
32Rivalries might emerge also among mafia groups, which in turn might signal their strength to the
competing groups attacking local politicians. Although this might be plausible, it is highly unlikely linked
to our results. In fact, such rivalries - in order to partially explain our findings - should systematically
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after an election in retaliation for a particularly harsh electoral campaign.33 However, this
mechanism is highly unlikely related to our findings. First, for attacks to be unrelated
to organized crime, this effect should apply to both regions with and without organized
crime involvement in politics, and with and without a change in government. Second,
political conflicts should be more likely in highly contested elections. Yet when testing
whether highly competitive electoral rounds lead to more attacks, we do not observe any
significant difference between highly contested and weakly contested elections (defined
by small margins of victory of one candidate over another). We report these findings
in Table A8, where we replicate previous models distinguishing between elections based
on the level of electoral competition. Here we define electoral competitiveness as the
difference in vote share between the winning mayoral candidate and the runner-up. We
distinguish elections in quartiles from the most contested (in the first quartile) to the least
contested (in the fourth quartile). Specifically, the increase in violence in the period t+ 1
seems mostly driven by the 3rd quartile of cities in terms of electoral competition.34
5.1.5 Endogeneity of the change in government
We might be concerned that the change in government is in some way endogenous to
the number of attacks received by the municipality. For example, successful municipal
governments might be re-elected more (less change) and be less likely to be a target for
mafias (less attacks). While there is no theoretical reason to expect such a relation to
exist, - we would rather expect governments acting against mafias’ interests to be more
popular - we present a test which excludes this possibility. In Table A9, we run our analysis
increase immediately after local elections, and especially after the election of a new local government.
33This idea is suggested by Villarreal (2002), who shows how homicides increase during highly compet-
itive elections in Mexican cities. In this light, Moro, Petrella, and Sberna (2016) find a higher homicide
rate in Italian cities characterized by political fragmentation.
34In this case the sample is smaller due to 80 missing observations on electoral results from the website
of the Italian Ministry of Interior.
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on the subset of cities in which a change in government was mandatory due to the rule
establishing a maximum of two-terms for each mayor. By restricting the sample to cities
with compulsory change only, we drastically drop observations from 5,184 (276 cities) to
1,812 (97 cities). However, even in this restricted sample our results are confirmed as
the coefficient t + 1*Mafia is statistically significant at the 10% level (column 2). As
in previous tables, in column 5, we test the triple interacted term. In this case, the lack
of significance is due to the inclusion in the control group of cities that did not have a
compulsory change but that still had a change in government. Therefore, in column 6, we
directly compare cities with compulsory change and cities without governmental change.
In this case, the triple interacted term is statistically significant, showing that our results
are robust even dropping all cases of not-compulsory governmental changes.
5.1.6 Other robustness tests
We ran a series of additional robustness tests to check the validity of our findings. First,
we want to assess whether the timing of the attacks is affected by the characteristics of
the attacked politicians (i.e. gender, age, education). We did not find any significant
variation based of such variables. Instead, we do not run tests to consider variation
by party affiliation of the victim because in municipal elections candidates often run in
civic lists which are not, at least officially, direct expressions of a national party. Party
identification of local politicians is therefore difficult and very often arbitrary. Second,
to rule out the possibility that our results are driven by an upward trend in violence in
Southern high-crime regions, we estimate a model including region-month fixed effects
and our results are unaffected by this additional control.35 We cannot run a placebo test
using the general level of violence because those data are not available at the municipal
35Results available upon request.
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level in Italy. Finally, we test the hypothesis that there is an effect beyond the first 30
days of government. In Table A10, we run our analysis considering periods of 60 days from
elections and find that, indeed, the coefficient of interest is still positive and statistically
significant, even if of smaller size. When extending the period considered to 90 days
after elections, the effect is still significant but the size is strongly reduced. The effect
disappears when considering longer time periods. These results are consistent with idea
that criminal organizations have incentive to attack in the very first weeks after election,
when some crucial decisions are taken by the new government.
6 Conclusions
Criminal organizations aim to influence politics in several countries around the world. In
Italy, according to our data, there were 312 attacks against politicians in 2014, a trend that
has been increasing since we started measuring it in 2010. Why do criminal organizations
attack politicians, and which strategies do they use to influence politics? Two theories have
been advanced. For Pinotti (2012), Sberna and Olivieri (2014) and Alesina, Piccolo, and
Pinotti (2016), criminal organizations try to discourage honest politicians from running
for office, and therefore tend to strike in the period before elections. Dal Bo´ and Di Tella
(2003) and Dal Bo´, Dal Bo´, and Di Tella (2006) instead predict violence after elections,
in order to condition the government’s activities.
Exploiting the specific design of Italian municipal elections as a source of exogeneity,
we causally identify the effect of the electoral period in triggering violence targeted at
politicians. The probability of an attack substantially increases in the month immediately
following elections, a result that is statistically significant and applies only to regions in
which criminal organizations are very politically active. This result does not seem to be
driven by the harshness of electoral rivalry. Instead, in line with the model proposed
30
by Dal Bo´ and Di Tella (2003) and Dal Bo´, Dal Bo´, and Di Tella (2006), we show that
mafias attack at the start of a political term to prove they are influential from the very
beginning. Important decisions made right after elections, such as political and managerial
appointments, can be conditioned if organized crime intimidates the politician from the
very start, a strategy that could also be optimal in terms of maximizing habit formation
and minimizing reputation costs by preventing the new government from acting against
the interests of the criminal group. Consistent with this explanation, we show that the
increase in attacks observed after election day is largely driven by cities that elect a new
government; there is no effect in cities where the mayor is re-elected. Our results are robust
to a different set of specifications for mafia-affected areas and to different definitions of
the dependent variable, accounting for potential sources of selection bias.
These findings contribute to our understanding of how election outcomes affect the
strategies organized crime groups use to influence politics (Becker, 1968; Dal Bo´ and Di
Tella, 2003; Dal Bo´, Dal Bo´, and Di Tella, 2006; Draca and Machin, 2015). Differently
from previous studies, this paper models electoral pressure as a product of violence di-
rected at politicians rather than relying on general measures of violence, as in Pinotti
(2012) and Sberna and Olivieri (2014) – a feature that is also likely to explain the dif-
ferences in findings from these studies. Our findings are also different from those in
Alesina, Piccolo, and Pinotti (2016), who focus on national elections, on a different pe-
riod (1887–2013) and on homicides only, a typology of violence that is quite different
from intimidatory attacks and which is thus likely to be adopted along with a different
set of strategies than the ones suggested in this study. Finally, while we provide evidence
of mafia-driven post-electoral violence in local elections, we do not deny the existence of
other, non-violent pre-electoral strategies –e.g., vote buying and other forms of pressure
– which are not the object of this study.
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A Appendix
Figure A.1: Number of attacks by month from election
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Figure A.2: Probability of being a target of violence, 6 months window
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Note: The figure shows plotted coefficients from panel estimates where the dependent variable is a dummy
equal to one (0 otherwise) if there is at least one attack in city i in period t. We consider 30 days periods
going from -6 to +6 (six months before and after the elections). Each variable is a dummy equal to one
in the respective period. High(Low) Organized Crime (here referred as M) is a dummy equal to one only
for regions with high(low) involvement of criminal organizations in politics. The base category is the
period -6 to election. The lines report 5% confidence intervals.
33
Table A1: Test on 6 months window
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entire Gov No Gov Entire
Sample Change Change Sample
t+1 0.000255 -0.0440 0.509 0.367**
(0.0417) (0.0404) (0.320) (0.161)
t+1*Mafia 0.0758** 0.117** 0.00551 0.0292
(0.0348) (0.0519) (0.0580) (0.113)
Gov. Change 0.0310
(0.117)
t+1*Gov. Change -0.106
(0.111)
t+1*Mafia*Gov. Change 0.201
(0.149)
Constant -0.0411 -0.0138 -0.695 -0.539***
(0.0497) (0.0491) (0.519) (0.111)
City FE YES YES YES YES
Month FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 4,857 3,166 1,691 2,026
R-squared 0.011 0.016 0.032 0.045
Number of cities-cycle 421 276 149 172
Note: The table shows the results from a panel analysis where the dependent
variable is a dummy equal to one (0 otherwise) if there is an attack in city i
at time t. t+1 is a dummy equal to 1 (0 otherwise) in the 30 days after the
election day. Gov.Change equal to 1 (0 otherwise) if a new mayor is elected.
Mafia is a dummy equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for cities in Sicilia, Campania and
Calabria. The reference category is period t − 6. In this specification, we re-
strict the window of observation to 6 months before and after elections. Robust
standard errors clustered at the municipality level (in brackets). *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A2: Reference period t-1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entire Gov No Gov Entire
Sample Change Change Sample
t+1 -0.0450* -0.0834*** 0.0486 -0.00232
(0.0255) (0.0318) (0.0384) (0.0374)
t+1*Mafia 0.0831** 0.148*** -0.0326 -0.0132
(0.0322) (0.0424) (0.0510) (0.0449)
Gov.Change 0.0526*
(0.0295)
Mafia*Gov.Change 0.0373
(0.0244)
t+1*Gov.Change -0.0635**
(0.0321)
t+1*Mafia*Gov.Change 0.151***
(0.0502)
City FE YES YES YES YES
Month FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 7,965 5,184 2,781 7,965
R-squared 0.011 0.015 0.031 0.013
Number of cities-cycle 421 276 149 421
Note: The table shows the results from a panel analysis where the dependent
variable is a dummy equal to one (0 otherwise) if there is an attack in city i at
time t. t+1 is a dummy equal to 1 (0 otherwise) in the 30 days after the election
day. In this table, we use the dummy for t − 1 as reference category instead of
t−12 as in the other tables. Gov.Change equal to 1 (0 otherwise) if a new mayor
is elected. Mafia is a dummy equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for cities in Sicilia, Cam-
pania and Calabria. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level
(in brackets). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure A.3: Probability of being a target of violence, visible attacks, change in government
-1
-.5
0
.5
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
of
 a
tta
ck
t -
11
 #
 M
=1
t -
10
 #
 M
=1
t -
9 
# 
M
=1
t -
8 
# 
M
=1
t -
7 
# 
M
=1
t -
6 
# 
M
=1
t -
5 
# 
M
=1
t -
4 
# 
M
=1
t -
3 
# 
M
=1
t -
2 
# 
M
=1
t -
1 
# 
M
=1
t +
1 
# 
M
=1
t +
2 
# 
M
=1
t +
3 
# 
M
=1
t +
4 
# 
M
=1
t +
5 
# 
M
=1
t +
6 
# 
M
=1
t +
7 
# 
M
=1
t +
8 
# 
M
=1
t +
9 
# 
M
=1
t +
10
 #
 M
=1
t +
11
 #
 M
=1
t +
12
 #
 M
=1
Periods from election
No Change in Government - High Crime Regions
-1
-.5
0
.5
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
of
 a
tta
ck
t -
11
 #
 M
=1
t -
10
 #
 M
=1
t -
9 
# 
M
=1
t -
8 
# 
M
=1
t -
7 
# 
M
=1
t -
6 
# 
M
=1
t -
5 
# 
M
=1
t -
4 
# 
M
=1
t -
3 
# 
M
=1
t -
2 
# 
M
=1
t -
1 
# 
M
=1
t +
1 
# 
M
=1
t +
2 
# 
M
=1
t +
3 
# 
M
=1
t +
4 
# 
M
=1
t +
5 
# 
M
=1
t +
6 
# 
M
=1
t +
7 
# 
M
=1
t +
8 
# 
M
=1
t +
9 
# 
M
=1
t +
10
 #
 M
=1
t +
11
 #
 M
=1
t +
12
 #
 M
=1
Periods from election
Change in Government - High Crime Regions
-1
-.5
0
.5
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
of
 a
tta
ck
t -
11
t -
10 t -
9
t -
8
t -
7
t -
6
t -
5
t -
4
t -
3
t -
2
t -
1
t +
1
t +
2
t +
3
t +
4
t +
5
t +
6
t +
7
t +
8
t +
9
t +
10
t +
11
t +
12
Periods from election
No Change in Government - Low Crime Regions
-1
-.5
0
.5
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
of
 a
tta
ck
t -
11
t -
10 t -
9
t -
8
t -
7
t -
6
t -
5
t -
4
t -
3
t -
2
t -
1
t +
1
t +
2
t +
3
t +
4
t +
5
t +
6
t +
7
t +
8
t +
9
t +
10
t +
11
t +
12
Periods from election
Change in Government - Low Crime Regions
Note: The figure shows plotted coefficients from panel estimates where the dependent variable is a dummy
equal to 1 (0 otherwise) if there is at least one visible attack in city i in period t. We consider 30-day
periods from -12 to + 12 (12 months before and after the elections). Each variable is a dummy equal
to 1 in the respective period. High(Low) Organized Crime (here referred to as M) is a dummy equal to
1 only for regions with high(low) criminal organization involvement in politics. The dummy change, for
which we subset the regression, takes a value of 1 only when the election led to the appointment of a new
government in city i. The base category is the period -12 to election. The lines report 5% confidence
intervals.
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Table A3: Visible Attacks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entire Gov No Gov Entire
Sample Change Change Sample
t+1 -0.0540 -0.101 0.132 0.0793
(0.0547) (0.0747) (0.0833) (0.0749)
t+1*Mafia 0.128** 0.220** -0.0290 -0.0227
(0.0603) (0.0866) (0.0832) (0.0812)
Gov.Change 0.160**
(0.0716)
t+1*Gov.Change -0.161**
(0.0755)
t+1*Mafia*Gov.Change 0.229
(0.118)
City FE YES YES YES YES
Month FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,318 2,057 1,261 3,318
R-squared 0.019 0.027 0.062 0.034
Number of cities-cycle 172 107 67 172
Note: The table shows the results from a panel analysis where the dependent
variable is a dummy equal to one (0 otherwise) if there is a ”visible” attack in
city i at time t. t+1 is a dummy equal to 1 (0 otherwise) in the 30 days after
the election day. Gov.Change equal to 1(0 otherwise) if a new mayor is elected.
Mafia is a dummy equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for cities in Sicilia, Campania and
Calabria. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level (in
brackets). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure A.4: Probability of being a target of violence, salient attacks, change in government
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Note: The figure shows plotted coefficients from panel estimates where the dependent variable is a dummy
equal to 1 (0 otherwise) if there is at least one salient attack in city i in period t. We consider 30-day
periods from -12 to + 12(12 months before and after the elections). Each variable is a dummy equal to
1 in the respective period. High(Low) Organized Crime (here referred to as M) is a dummy equal to 1
only for regions with high(low) criminal organization involvement in politics. The dummy change, for
which we subset the regression, takes a value of 1 only when the election led to the appointment of a new
government in city i. The base category is the period -12 to election. The lines report 5% confidence
intervals.
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Table A4: Salient Attacks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entire Gov No Gov Entire
Sample Change Change Sample
t+1 -0.0572 -0.126 0.0997 0.109
(0.0547) (0.0691) (0.0895) (0.0768)
t+1*Mafia 0.108 0.230*** -0.129 -0.119
(0.0586) (0.0872) (0.0792) (0.0784)
Gov.Change 0.194***
(0.0663)
t+1*Gov.Change -0.232***
(0.0792)
Mafia*Gov.Change -0.0866
(0.0845)
t+1*Mafia*Gov.Change 0.341***
(0.117)
City FE YES YES YES YES
Month FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 4,031 2,543 1,488 4,031
R-squared 0.017 0.024 0.057 0.032
Number of cities-cycle 209 133 79 209
Note: The table shows the results from a panel analysis where the dependent
variable is a dummy equal to one (0 otherwise) if there is a ”salient” attack in
city i at time t. t+1 is a dummy equal to 1 (0 otherwise) in the 30 days after
the election day. Gov.Change equal to 1 (0 otherwise) if a new mayor is elected.
Mafia is a dummy equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for cities in Sicilia, Campania and
Calabria. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level (in
brackets). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A5: Test on seized firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entire Gov No Gov Entire
Sample Change Change Sample
t+1 -0.00671 -0.0309 0.0368 0.0377
(0.0251) (0.0326) (0.0391) (0.0285)
t+1*Seized Firms 0.0752 0.142** -0.0430 -0.0398
(0.0496) (0.0688) (0.0678) (0.0676)
Change 0.105***
(0.0387)
t+1*Change -0.0644**
(0.0311)
Seized Firms*Change -0.0605
(0.0698)
t+1*Seized Firms*Change 0.180*
(0.0966)
Constant 0.0174 0.0324 0.0287 -0.0352
(0.0231) (0.0306) (0.0411) (0.0264)
City FE YES YES YES YES
Month FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 7,965 5,184 2,781 7,965
R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.036 0.019
Number of cities-cycle 421 276 149 421
Note: The table shows the results from a panel analysis where the dependent
variable is a dummy equal to one (0 otherwise) if there is an attack in city i at
time t. t+1 and t+2 is a dummy equal to 1 (0 otherwise) in the 60 days after
the election day. Change equal to 1 (0 otherwise) if a new mayor is elected.
Seizured Firms is a dummy equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for cities in which there
was at least one seizured firm from mafias. Robust standard errors clustered
at the municipality level (in brackets). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A6: Test on cities dissolved for Mafia infiltrations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entire Gov No Gov Entire
Sample Change Change Sample
t+1 0.000811 -0.0230 0.0432 0.0476*
(0.0244) (0.0317) (0.0407) (0.0288)
t+1*Dissolved 0.0653 0.169* -0.108 -0.103
(0.0630) (0.0862) (0.0829) (0.0833)
Change 0.112***
(0.0364)
t+1*Change -0.0689**
(0.0310)
t+1*Dissolved*Change 0.273**
(0.120)
Constant 0.0115 0.0290 0.0275 -0.0505**
(0.0229) (0.0307) (0.0405) (0.0246)
City FE YES YES YES YES
Month FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 7,965 5,184 2,781 7,965
R-squared 0.010 0.014 0.028 0.018
Number of cities-cycle 421 276 149 421
Note: The table shows the results from a panel analysis where the depen-
dent variable is a dummy equal to one (0 otherwise) if there is an attack
in city i at time t. t+1 and t+2 is a dummy equal to 1 (0 otherwise) in the
60 days after the election day. Change equal to 1 (0 otherwise) if a new
mayor is elected. Dissolved is a dummy equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for cities
whose municipal government was dissolved due to Mafia infiltrations. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the municipality level (in brackets). ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure A.5: Probability of being a target of violence: alternative mafia measure (top five
provinces)
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Note: The figure shows plotted coefficients from panel estimates where the dependent variable is a dummy
equal to 1 (0 otherwise) if there is at least one attack in city i in period t. We consider 30-day periods
from -12 to + 12(12 months before and after the elections). Each variable is a dummy equal to 1 in
the respective period. High(Low) Organized Crime (here referred to as M) is a dummy equal to 1 only
for provinces with high(low) criminal organization involvement in politics according to Calderoni (2011).
The dummy change, for which we subset the regression, takes a value of 1 only when the election led to
the appointment of a new government in city i. The lines report 5% confidence intervals.
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Table A7: Alternative Mafia Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entire Gov No Gov Entire
Sample Change Change Sample
t+1 -0.00337 -0.0288 0.0374 0.0435
(0.0252) (0.0329) (0.0394) (0.0295)
t+1*Mafia(Top5) 0.0729 0.159** -0.0655 -0.0653
(0.0514) (0.0740) (0.0627) (0.0616)
Gov.Change 0.108***
(0.0368)
t+1*Gov.Change -0.0699**
(0.0319)
t+1*Mafia(Top5)*Gov.Change 0.223**
(0.0962)
City FE YES YES YES YES
Month FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 7,965 5,184 2,781 7,965
R-squared 0.011 0.014 0.036 0.020
Number of cities-cycle 421 276 149 421
Note: The table shows the results from a panel analysis where the dependent variable is a
dummy equal to one (0 otherwise) if there is a ”salient” attack in city i at time t. t+1 is a
dummy equal to 1 (0 otherwise) in the 30 days after the election day. Gov.Change equal to
1 (0 otherwise) if a new mayor is elected. Mafia(Top5) is a dummy equal to 1 (0 other-
wise) for provinces which, according to Calderoni (2011), rank as the top 5 for mafia presence
mafia presence. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level (in brackets).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A8: Electoral Competitiveness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st Q. 2nd Q. 3rdQ. 4thQ.
t+1 0.0870 -0.0165 -0.138 0.0379
(0.0561) (0.0145) (0.1000) (0.0307)
t+1*Mafia 0.155 0.0239 0.292*** -0.106
(0.0968) (0.0316) (0.0961) (0.0655)
City FE YES YES YES YES
Month FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,595 1,585 1,585 1,624
R-squared 0.052 0.042 0.055 0.039
Number of cities-cycle 85 87 86 85
Note: The table shows the results from a panel analysis where the
dependent variable is a dummy equal to one (0 otherwise) if there is an
attack in city i at time t. t+1 is a dummy equal to 1 (0 otherwise) in the
30 days after the election day. Gov.Change equal to 1 (0 otherwise) if a
new mayor is elected. Mafia is a dummy equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for
cities in Sicilia, Campania and Calabria. The four categories of electoral
competitiveness are defined as the share of the votes’ differences between
the winner and the second most voted candidate for the mayoral office.
Specifically, we compute four quartiles, where the 1st quartile corresponds
to the highest level of competitiveness and the 4th to the lowest level.
Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level (in brackets).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A10: Test on 60 days periods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entire Gov No Gov Entire
Sample Change Change Sample
t+1 an t+2 -0.0288 -0.0525* 0.0335 0.0210
(0.0225) (0.0282) (0.0364) (0.0251)
t+1 an t+2*Mafia 0.0631*** 0.101*** -0.0127 -0.0109
(0.0205) (0.0272) (0.0286) (0.0285)
Change 0.105***
(0.0343)
t+1 an t+2*Change -0.0691***
(0.0239)
Mafia*Change -0.0269
(0.0352)
t+1 an t+2*Mafia*Change 0.111***
(0.0394)
Constant 0.0163 0.0228 0.0415 -0.0375*
(0.0201) (0.0259) (0.0304) (0.0201)
City FE YES YES YES YES
Month FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 7,965 5,184 2,781 7,965
R-squared 0.006 0.010 0.014 0.010
Number of cities-cycle 421 276 149 421
Note: The table shows the results from a panel analysis where the dependent vari-
able is a dummy equal to one (0 otherwise) if there is an attack in city i at time
t. t+1 and t+2 is a dummy equal to 1 (0 otherwise) in the 60 days after the elec-
tion day. Change equal to 1 (0 otherwise) if a new mayor is elected. Mafia is a
dummy equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for cities in Sicilia, Campania and Calabria. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the municipality level (in brackets). *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
46
Table A11: Descriptive Statistics
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Attack 7,965 0.046955 0.255143 0 5
Attack, dummy 7,965 0.040427 0.196971 0 1
Visible 7,965 0.029755 0.197914 0 5
Visible, dummy 7,965 0.02624 0.159858 0 1
Salient 7,965 0.041557 0.241179 0 5
Election 7,965 0.054488 0.226993 0 1
Gov.Change 7,965 0.650848 0.476732 0 1
Mafia 7,965 0.483239 0.49975 0 1
Mafia (Calderoni, 2011) 7,965 0.186943 0.38989 0 1
Seized firms, dummy 7,965 0.2100439 0.4073651 0 1
Dissolved councils, dummy 7,965 0.1530446 0.3600531 0 1
47
References
[1] Daron Acemoglu, James A Robinson, and Rafael J Santos. “The monopoly of vi-
olence: Evidence from Colombia”. Journal of the European Economic Association
11.s1 (2013), pp. 5–44.
[2] Akhmed Akhmedov and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. “Opportunistic political cycles:
test in a young democracy setting”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2004),
pp. 1301–1338.
[3] Alberto Alesina, Salvatore Piccolo, and Paolo Pinotti. “Organized Crime, Violence,
and Politics”. NBER Working Papers 22093 (2016). url: https://ideas.repec.
org/p/nbr/nberwo/22093.html.
[4] David Austen-Smith. “Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic
voting”. Public choice 54.2 (1987), pp. 123–139.
[5] David P Baron. “Electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters.”
American Political Science Review 88.01 (1994), pp. 33–47.
[6] Guglielmo Barone and Gaia Narciso. “The effect of mafia on public transfers”. Trin-
ity Economics Papers tep2111 (2011). url: https://ideas.repec.org/p/tcd/
tcduee/tep2111.html.
[7] Gary S Becker. “Crime and punishment: An economic approach”. The Economic
Dimensions of Crime. Springer, 1968, pp. 13–68.
[8] Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate. “Lobbying and welfare in a representative
democracy”. The Review of Economic Studies 68.1 (2001), pp. 67–82.
[9] Adi Brender and Allan Drazen. “Political budget cycles in new versus established
democracies”. Journal of monetary Economics 52.7 (2005), pp. 1271–1295.
[10] Francesco Calderoni. “Where is the mafia in Italy? Measuring the presence of the
mafia across Italian provinces”. Global Crime 12.1 (2011), pp. 41–69.
[11] Antoine Cazals and Alexandre Sauquet. “How do elections affect international coop-
eration? Evidence from environmental treaty participation”. Public Choice 162.3-4
(2015), pp. 263–285.
[12] Ernesto Dal Bo´, Pedro Dal Bo´, and Rafael Di Tella. ““Plata o Plomo?”: Bribe and
Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence”. American Political Science Review
100.01 (2006), pp. 41–53.
[13] Ernesto Dal Bo´ and Rafael Di Tella. “Capture by threat”. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 111.5 (2003), pp. 1123–1154.
[14] Gianmarco Daniele. “Strike one to educate one hundred: organized crime, political
selection and politicians’ ability”. IEB Working Paper (2015). url: http://dx.
doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2706594.
48
[15] Gianmarco Daniele and Benny Geys. “Organised crime, institutions and political
quality: Empirical evidence from italian municipalities”. The Economic Journal
125.586 (2015), F233–F255.
[16] Giuseppe De Feo and Giacomo De Luca. “Mafia in the ballot box”. SIRE Discussion
Papers 2013-104 (2013). url: https://ideas.repec.org/p/edn/sirdps/529.
html.
[17] Melissa Dell. “Trafficking networks and the Mexican drug war”. The American Eco-
nomic Review 105.6 (2015), pp. 1738–1779.
[18] Mirko Draca and Stephen Machin. “Crime and Economic Incentives”. Annual Re-
view of Economics 7.1 (2015), pp. 389–408.
[19] Jr Franzese and J Robert. “Electoral and partisan manipulation of public debt
in developed democracies, 1956–90”. Institutions, politics and fiscal policy (2000),
pp. 61–83.
[20] Roland Hodler and Dominic Rohner. “Electoral terms and terrorism”. Public Choice
150.1-2 (2012), pp. 181–193.
[21] Doris Lo Moro et al. “Commissione Parlamentare d’inchiesta sul fenomeno delle in-
timidazioni nei confronti degli amministratori locali, Relazione Conclusiva”. Senato
della Repubblica Italiana (2015).
[22] Francesco N Moro, Andrea Petrella, and Salvatore Sberna. “The Politics of Mafia
Violence: Explaining Variation in Mafia Killings in Southern Italy (1983–2008)”.
Terrorism and Political Violence 28.1 (2016), pp. 90–113.
[23] Paolo Pinotti. “Organized crime, violence and the quality of politicians: Evidence
from southern italy”. Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper 2012-124 (2012). url:
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2144121.
[24] Paolo Pinotti. “The economic costs of organised crime: Evidence from Southern
Italy”. The Economic Journal 125.586 (2015), F203–F232.
[25] Salvatore Sberna and Elisabetta Olivieri. “’Set the Night on Fire!’Mafia Violence
and Elections in Italy”. Mafia Violence and Elections in Italy (2014). url: http:
//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2451701.
[26] Min Shi and Jakob Svensson. “Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries
and why?” Journal of public economics 90.8 (2006), pp. 1367–1389.
[27] Richard Snyder and Angelica Duran-Martinez. “Does illegality breed violence? Drug
trafficking and state-sponsored protection rackets”. Crime, law and social change
52.3 (2009), pp. 253–273.
[28] Andre´s Villarreal. “Political competition and violence in Mexico: Hierarchical so-
cial control in local patronage structures”. American Sociological Review (2002),
pp. 477–498.
49
  
 
IEB Working Papers  
2012 
 
2012/1, Montolio, D.; Trujillo, E.: "What drives investment in telecommunications? The role of regulation, firms’ 
internationalization and market knowledge" 
2012/2, Giesen, K.; Suedekum, J.: "The size distribution across all “cities”: a unifying approach" 
2012/3, Foremny, D.; Riedel, N.: "Business taxes and the electoral cycle" 
2012/4, García-Estévez, J.; Duch-Brown, N.: "Student graduation: to what extent does university expenditure matter?" 
2012/5, Durán-Cabré, J.M.; Esteller-Moré, A.; Salvadori, L.: "Empirical evidence on horizontal competition in tax 
enforcement" 
2012/6, Pickering, A.C.; Rockey, J.: "Ideology and the growth of US state government" 
2012/7, Vergolini, L.; Zanini, N.: "How does aid matter? The effect of financial aid on university enrolment decisions" 
2012/8, Backus, P.: "Gibrat’s law and legacy for non-profit organisations: a non-parametric analysis" 
2012/9, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Marín-López, R.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "What underlies localization and urbanization 
economies? Evidence from the location of new firms" 
2012/10, Mantovani, A.; Vandekerckhove, J.: "The strategic interplay between bundling and merging in 
complementary markets" 
2012/11, Garcia-López, M.A.: "Urban spatial structure, suburbanization and transportation in Barcelona" 
2012/12, Revelli, F.: "Business taxation and economic performance in hierarchical government structures" 
2012/13, Arqué-Castells, P.; Mohnen, P.: "Sunk costs, extensive R&D subsidies and permanent inducement effects" 
2012/14, Boffa, F.; Piolatto, A.; Ponzetto, G.: "Centralization and accountability: theory and evidence from the Clean 
Air Act" 
2012/15, Cheshire, P.C.; Hilber, C.A.L.; Kaplanis, I.: "Land use regulation and productivity – land matters: evidence 
from a UK supermarket chain" 
2012/16, Choi, A.; Calero, J.: "The contribution of the disabled to the attainment of the Europe 2020 strategy headline 
targets" 
2012/17, Silva, J.I.; Vázquez-Grenno, J.: "The ins and outs of unemployment in a two-tier labor market" 
2012/18, González-Val, R.; Lanaspa, L.; Sanz, F.: "New evidence on Gibrat’s law for cities" 
2012/19, Vázquez-Grenno, J.: "Job search methods in times of crisis: native and immigrant strategies in Spain" 
2012/20, Lessmann, C.: "Regional inequality and decentralization – an empirical analysis" 
2012/21, Nuevo-Chiquero, A.: "Trends in shotgun marriages: the pill, the will or the cost?" 
2012/22, Piil Damm, A.: "Neighborhood quality and labor market outcomes: evidence from quasi-random neighborhood 
assignment of immigrants" 
2012/23, Ploeckl, F.: "Space, settlements, towns: the influence of geography and market access on settlement distribution 
and urbanization" 
2012/24, Algan, Y.; Hémet, C.; Laitin, D.: "Diversity and local public goods: a natural experiment with exogenous 
residential allocation" 
2012/25, Martinez, D.; Sjögren, T.: "Vertical externalities with lump-sum taxes: how much difference does 
unemployment make?" 
2012/26, Cubel, M.; Sanchez-Pages, S.: "The effect of within-group inequality in a conflict against a unitary threat" 
2012/27, Andini, M.; De Blasio, G.; Duranton, G.; Strange, W.C.: "Marshallian labor market pooling: evidence from 
Italy" 
2012/28, Solé-Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Do political parties matter for local land use policies?" 
2012/29, Buonanno, P.; Durante, R.; Prarolo, G.; Vanin, P.: "Poor institutions, rich mines: resource curse and the 
origins of the Sicilian mafia" 
2012/30, Anghel, B.; Cabrales, A.; Carro, J.M.: "Evaluating a bilingual education program in Spain: the impact beyond 
foreign language learning" 
2012/31, Curto-Grau, M.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: "Partisan targeting of inter-governmental transfers & 
state interference in local elections: evidence from Spain" 
2012/32, Kappeler, A.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Stephan, A.; Välilä, T.: "Does fiscal decentralization foster regional investment 
in productive infrastructure?" 
2012/33, Rizzo, L.; Zanardi, A.: "Single vs double ballot and party coalitions: the impact on fiscal policy. Evidence from 
Italy" 
2012/34, Ramachandran, R.: "Language use in education and primary schooling attainment: evidence from a natural 
experiment in Ethiopia" 
2012/35, Rothstein, J.: "Teacher quality policy when supply matters" 
2012/36, Ahlfeldt, G.M.: "The hidden dimensions of urbanity" 
  
 
IEB Working Papers  
2012/37, Mora, T.; Gil, J.; Sicras-Mainar, A.: "The influence of BMI, obesity and overweight on medical costs: a panel 
data approach" 
2012/38, Pelegrín, A.; García-Quevedo, J.: "Which firms are involved in foreign vertical integration?" 
2012/39, Agasisti, T.; Longobardi, S.: "Inequality in education: can Italian disadvantaged students close the gap? A 
focus on resilience in the Italian school system" 
 
 
2013 
 
2013/1, Sánchez-Vidal, M.; González-Val, R.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Sequential city growth in the US: does age 
matter?" 
2013/2, Hortas Rico, M.: "Sprawl, blight and the role of urban containment policies. Evidence from US cities" 
2013/3, Lampón, J.F.; Cabanelas-Lorenzo, P-; Lago-Peñas, S.: "Why firms relocate their production overseas? The 
answer lies inside: corporate, logistic and technological determinants" 
2013/4, Montolio, D.; Planells, S.: "Does tourism boost criminal activity? Evidence from a top touristic country" 
2013/5, Garcia-López, M.A.; Holl, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Suburbanization and highways: when the Romans, the 
Bourbons and the first cars still shape Spanish cities" 
2013/6, Bosch, N.; Espasa, M.; Montolio, D.: "Should large Spanish municipalities be financially compensated? Costs 
and benefits of being a capital/central municipality" 
2013/7, Escardíbul, J.O.; Mora, T.: "Teacher gender and student performance in mathematics. Evidence from 
Catalonia" 
2013/8, Arqué-Castells, P.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Banking towards development: evidence from the Spanish banking 
expansion plan" 
2013/9, Asensio, J.; Gómez-Lobo, A.; Matas, A.: "How effective are policies to reduce gasoline consumption? 
Evaluating a quasi-natural experiment in Spain" 
2013/10, Jofre-Monseny, J.: "The effects of unemployment benefits on migration in lagging regions" 
2013/11, Segarra, A.; García-Quevedo, J.; Teruel, M.: "Financial constraints and the failure of innovation projects" 
2013/12, Jerrim, J.; Choi, A.: "The mathematics skills of school children: How does England compare to the high 
performing East Asian jurisdictions?" 
2013/13, González-Val, R.; Tirado-Fabregat, D.A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Market potential and city growth: Spain 
1860-1960" 
2013/14, Lundqvist, H.: "Is it worth it? On the returns to holding political office" 
2013/15, Ahlfeldt, G.M.; Maennig, W.: "Homevoters vs. leasevoters: a spatial analysis of airport effects" 
2013/16, Lampón, J.F.; Lago-Peñas, S.: "Factors behind international relocation and changes in production geography 
in the European automobile components industry" 
2013/17, Guío, J.M.; Choi, A.: "Evolution of the school failure risk during the 2000 decade in Spain: analysis of Pisa 
results with a two-level logistic mode" 
2013/18, Dahlby, B.; Rodden, J.: "A political economy model of the vertical fiscal gap and vertical fiscal imbalances in 
a federation" 
2013/19, Acacia, F.; Cubel, M.: "Strategic voting and happiness" 
2013/20, Hellerstein, J.K.; Kutzbach, M.J.; Neumark, D.: "Do labor market networks have an important spatial 
dimension?" 
2013/21, Pellegrino, G.; Savona, M.: "Is money all? Financing versus knowledge and demand constraints to innovation" 
2013/22, Lin, J.: "Regional resilience" 
2013/23, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Duch-Brown, N.; García-Quevedo, J.: "R&D drivers and obstacles to innovation in the 
energy industry" 
2013/24, Huisman, R.; Stradnic, V.; Westgaard, S.: "Renewable energy and electricity prices: indirect empirical 
evidence from hydro power" 
2013/25, Dargaud, E.; Mantovani, A.; Reggiani, C.: "The fight against cartels: a transatlantic perspective" 
2013/26, Lambertini, L.; Mantovani, A.: "Feedback equilibria in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly: pre-emption, 
voracity and exhaustion" 
2013/27, Feld, L.P.; Kalb, A.; Moessinger, M.D.; Osterloh, S.: "Sovereign bond market reactions to fiscal rules and no-
bailout clauses – the Swiss experience" 
2013/28, Hilber, C.A.L.; Vermeulen, W.: "The impact of supply constraints on house prices in England" 
2013/29, Revelli, F.: "Tax limits and local democracy" 
2013/30, Wang, R.; Wang, W.: "Dress-up contest: a dark side of fiscal decentralization" 
2013/31, Dargaud, E.; Mantovani, A.; Reggiani, C.: "The fight against cartels: a transatlantic perspective" 
  
 
IEB Working Papers  
2013/32, Saarimaa, T.; Tukiainen, J.: "Local representation and strategic voting: evidence from electoral boundary 
reforms" 
2013/33, Agasisti, T.; Murtinu, S.: "Are we wasting public money? No! The effects of grants on Italian university 
students’ performances" 
2013/34, Flacher, D.; Harari-Kermadec, H.; Moulin, L.: "Financing higher education: a contributory scheme" 
2013/35, Carozzi, F.; Repetto, L.: "Sending the pork home: birth town bias in transfers to Italian municipalities" 
2013/36, Coad, A.; Frankish, J.S.; Roberts, R.G.; Storey, D.J.: "New venture survival and growth: Does the fog lift?" 
2013/37, Giulietti, M.; Grossi, L.; Waterson, M.: "Revenues from storage in a competitive electricity market: Empirical 
evidence from Great Britain" 
 
 
2014 
 
2014/1, Montolio, D.; Planells-Struse, S.: "When police patrols matter. The effect of police proximity on citizens’ crime 
risk perception" 
2014/2, Garcia-López, M.A.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Do land use policies follow road construction?" 
2014/3, Piolatto, A.; Rablen, M.D.: "Prospect theory and tax evasion: a reconsideration of the Yitzhaki puzzle" 
2014/4, Cuberes, D.; González-Val, R.: "The effect of the Spanish Reconquest on Iberian Cities" 
2014/5, Durán-Cabré, J.M.; Esteller-Moré, E.: "Tax professionals' view of the Spanish tax system: efficiency, equity 
and tax planning" 
2014/6, Cubel, M.; Sanchez-Pages, S.: "Difference-form group contests" 
2014/7, Del Rey, E.; Racionero, M.: "Choosing the type of income-contingent loan: risk-sharing versus risk-pooling" 
2014/8, Torregrosa Hetland, S.: "A fiscal revolution? Progressivity in the Spanish tax system, 1960-1990" 
2014/9, Piolatto, A.: "Itemised deductions: a device to reduce tax evasion" 
2014/10, Costa, M.T.; García-Quevedo, J.; Segarra, A.: "Energy efficiency determinants: an empirical analysis of 
Spanish innovative firms" 
2014/11, García-Quevedo, J.; Pellegrino, G.; Savona, M.: "Reviving demand-pull perspectives: the effect of demand 
uncertainty and stagnancy on R&D strategy" 
2014/12, Calero, J.; Escardíbul, J.O.: "Barriers to non-formal professional training in Spain in periods of economic 
growth and crisis. An analysis with special attention to the effect of the previous human capital of workers" 
2014/13, Cubel, M.; Sanchez-Pages, S.: "Gender differences and stereotypes in the beauty" 
2014/14, Piolatto, A.; Schuett, F.: "Media competition and electoral politics" 
2014/15, Montolio, D.; Trillas, F.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Regulatory environment and firm performance in EU 
telecommunications services" 
2014/16, Lopez-Rodriguez, J.; Martinez, D.: "Beyond the R&D effects on innovation: the contribution of non-R&D 
activities to TFP growth in the EU" 
2014/17, González-Val, R.: "Cross-sectional growth in US cities from 1990 to 2000" 
2014/18, Vona, F.; Nicolli, F.: "Energy market liberalization and renewable energy policies in OECD countries" 
2014/19, Curto-Grau, M.: "Voters’ responsiveness to public employment policies" 
2014/20, Duro, J.A.; Teixidó-Figueras, J.; Padilla, E.: "The causal factors of international inequality in co2 emissions 
per capita: a regression-based inequality decomposition analysis" 
2014/21, Fleten, S.E.; Huisman, R.; Kilic, M.; Pennings, E.; Westgaard, S.: "Electricity futures prices: time varying 
sensitivity to fundamentals" 
2014/22, Afcha, S.; García-Quevedo, J,: "The impact of R&D subsidies on R&D employment composition" 
2014/23, Mir-Artigues, P.; del Río, P.: "Combining tariffs, investment subsidies and soft loans in a renewable electricity 
deployment policy" 
2014/24, Romero-Jordán, D.; del Río, P.; Peñasco, C.: "Household electricity demand in Spanish regions. Public policy 
implications" 
2014/25, Salinas, P.: "The effect of decentralization on educational outcomes: real autonomy matters!" 
2014/26, Solé-Ollé, A.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: "Does corruption erode trust in government? Evidence from a recent 
surge of local scandals in Spain" 
2014/27, Costas-Pérez, E.: "Political corruption and voter turnout: mobilization or disaffection?" 
2014/28, Cubel, M.; Nuevo-Chiquero, A.; Sanchez-Pages, S.; Vidal-Fernandez, M.: "Do personality traits affect 
productivity? Evidence from the LAB" 
2014/29, Teresa Costa, M.T.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Retail price effects of feed-in tariff regulation" 
2014/30, Kilic, M.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "The stabilizing effect of hydro reservoir levels on intraday power prices under 
wind forecast errors" 
  
 
IEB Working Papers  
2014/31, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Duch-Brown, N.: "The diffusion of patented oil and gas technology with environmental 
uses: a forward patent citation analysis" 
2014/32, Ramos, R.; Sanromá, E.; Simón, H.: "Public-private sector wage differentials by type of contract: evidence 
from Spain" 
2014/33, Backus, P.; Esteller-Moré, A.: "Is income redistribution a form of insurance, a public good or both?" 
2014/34, Huisman, R.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Costs of power supply flexibility: the indirect impact of a Spanish policy 
change" 
2014/35, Jerrim, J.; Choi, A.; Simancas Rodríguez, R.: "Two-sample two-stage least squares (TSTSLS) estimates of 
earnings mobility: how consistent are they?" 
2014/36, Mantovani, A.;  Tarola, O.; Vergari, C.: "Hedonic quality, social norms, and environmental campaigns" 
2014/37, Ferraresi, M.; Galmarini, U.; Rizzo, L.: "Local infrastructures and externalities: Does the size matter?" 
2014/38, Ferraresi, M.; Rizzo, L.; Zanardi, A.: "Policy outcomes of single and double-ballot elections" 
 
 
2015 
 
2015/1, Foremny, D.; Freier, R.; Moessinger, M-D.; Yeter, M.: "Overlapping political budget cycles in the legislative 
and the executive" 
2015/2, Colombo, L.; Galmarini, U.: "Optimality and distortionary lobbying: regulating tobacco consumption" 
2015/3, Pellegrino, G.: "Barriers to innovation: Can firm age help lower them?" 
2015/4, Hémet, C.: "Diversity and employment prospects: neighbors matter!" 
2015/5, Cubel, M.; Sanchez-Pages, S.: "An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions" 
2015/6, Choi, A.; Jerrim, J.: "The use (and misuse) of Pisa in guiding policy reform: the case of Spain" 
2015/7, Durán-Cabré, J.M.; Esteller-Moré, A.; Salvadori, L.: "Empirical evidence on tax cooperation between sub-
central administrations" 
2015/8, Batalla-Bejerano, J.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Analysing the sensitivity of electricity system operational costs to 
deviations in supply and demand" 
2015/9, Salvadori, L.: "Does tax enforcement counteract the negative effects of terrorism? A case study of the Basque 
Country" 
2015/10, Montolio, D.; Planells-Struse, S.: "How time shapes crime: the temporal impacts of football matches on crime" 
2015/11, Piolatto, A.: "Online booking and information: competition and welfare consequences of review aggregators" 
2015/12, Boffa, F.; Pingali, V.; Sala, F.: "Strategic investment in merchant transmission: the impact of capacity 
utilization rules" 
2015/13, Slemrod, J.: "Tax administration and tax systems" 
2015/14, Arqué-Castells, P.; Cartaxo, R.M.; García-Quevedo, J.; Mira Godinho, M.: "How inventor royalty shares 
affect patenting and income in Portugal and Spain" 
2015/15, Montolio, D.; Planells-Struse, S.: "Measuring the negative externalities of a private leisure activity: hooligans 
and pickpockets around the stadium" 
2015/16, Batalla-Bejerano, J.; Costa-Campi, M.T.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Unexpected consequences of liberalisation: 
metering, losses, load profiles and cost settlement in Spain’s electricity system" 
2015/17, Batalla-Bejerano, J.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Impacts of intermittent renewable generation on electricity system 
costs" 
2015/18, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Paniagua, J.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Are energy market integrations a green light for FDI?" 
2015/19, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Sánchez-Vidal, M.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Big plant closures and agglomeration 
economies" 
2015/20, Garcia-López, M.A.; Hémet, C.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "How does transportation shape intrametropolitan 
growth? An answer from the regional express rail" 
2015/21, Esteller-Moré, A.; Galmarini, U.; Rizzo, L.: "Fiscal equalization under political pressures" 
2015/22, Escardíbul, J.O.; Afcha, S.: "Determinants of doctorate holders’ job satisfaction. An analysis by employment 
sector and type of satisfaction in Spain" 
2015/23, Aidt, T.; Asatryan, Z.; Badalyan, L.; Heinemann, F.: "Vote buying or (political) business (cycles) as usual?" 
2015/24, Albæk, K.: "A test of the ‘lose it or use it’ hypothesis in labour markets around the world" 
2015/25, Angelucci, C.; Russo, A.: "Petty corruption and citizen feedback" 
2015/26, Moriconi, S.; Picard, P.M.; Zanaj, S.: "Commodity taxation and regulatory competition" 
2015/27, Brekke, K.R.; Garcia Pires, A.J.; Schindler, D.; Schjelderup, G.: "Capital taxation and imperfect 
competition: ACE vs. CBIT" 
  
 
IEB Working Papers  
2015/28, Redonda, A.: "Market structure, the functional form of demand and the sensitivity of the vertical reaction 
function" 
2015/29, Ramos, R.; Sanromá, E.; Simón, H.: "An analysis of wage differentials between full-and part-time workers in 
Spain" 
2015/30, Garcia-López, M.A.; Pasidis, I.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Express delivery to the suburbs the effects of 
transportation in Europe’s heterogeneous cities" 
2015/31, Torregrosa, S.: "Bypassing progressive taxation: fraud and base erosion in the Spanish income tax (1970-
2001)" 
2015/32, Choi, H.; Choi, A.: "When one door closes: the impact of the hagwon curfew on the consumption of private 
tutoring in the republic of Korea" 
2015/33, Escardíbul, J.O.; Helmy, N.: "Decentralisation and school autonomy impact on the quality of education: the 
case of two MENA countries" 
2015/34, González-Val, R.; Marcén, M.: "Divorce and the business cycle: a cross-country analysis" 
2015/35, Calero, J.; Choi, A.: "The distribution of skills among the European adult population and unemployment: a 
comparative approach" 
2015/36, Mediavilla, M.; Zancajo, A.: "Is there real freedom of school choice? An analysis from Chile" 
2015/37, Daniele, G.: "Strike one to educate one hundred: organized crime, political selection and politicians’ ability" 
2015/38, González-Val, R.; Marcén, M.: "Regional unemployment, marriage, and divorce" 
2015/39, Foremny, D.; Jofre-Monseny, J.; Solé-Ollé, A.: "‘Hold that ghost’: using notches to identify manipulation of 
population-based grants" 
2015/40, Mancebón, M.J.; Ximénez-de-Embún, D.P.; Mediavilla, M.; Gómez-Sancho, J.M.: "Does educational 
management model matter? New evidence for Spain by a quasiexperimental approach" 
2015/41, Daniele, G.; Geys, B.: "Exposing politicians’ ties to criminal organizations: the effects of local government 
dissolutions on electoral outcomes in Southern Italian municipalities" 
2015/42, Ooghe, E.: "Wage policies, employment, and redistributive efficiency" 
 
 
2016 
 
2016/1, Galletta, S.: "Law enforcement, municipal budgets and spillover effects: evidence from a quasi-experiment in 
Italy" 
2016/2, Flatley, L.; Giulietti, M.; Grossi, L.; Trujillo-Baute, E.; Waterson, M.: "Analysing the potential economic 
value of energy storage" 
2016/3, Calero, J.; Murillo Huertas, I.P.; Raymond Bara, J.L.: "Education, age and skills: an analysis using the 
PIAAC survey" 
2016/4, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Daví-Arderius, D.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "The economic impact of electricity losses" 
2016/5, Falck, O.; Heimisch, A.; Wiederhold, S.: "Returns to ICT skills" 
2016/6, Halmenschlager, C.; Mantovani, A.: "On the private and social desirability of mixed bundling in 
complementary markets with cost savings" 
2016/7, Choi, A.; Gil, M.; Mediavilla, M.; Valbuena, J.: "Double toil and trouble: grade retention and academic 
performance" 
2016/8, González-Val, R.: "Historical urban growth in Europe (1300–1800)" 
2016/9, Guio, J.; Choi, A.; Escardíbul, J.O.: "Labor markets, academic performance and the risk of school dropout: 
evidence for Spain" 
2016/10, Bianchini, S.; Pellegrino, G.; Tamagni, F.: "Innovation strategies and firm growth" 
2016/11, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Silva, J.I.; Vázquez-Grenno, J.: "Local labor market effects of public employment" 
2016/12, Sanchez-Vidal, M.: "Small shops for sale! The effects of big-box openings on grocery stores" 
2016/13, Costa-Campi, M.T.; García-Quevedo, J.; Martínez-Ros, E.: "What are the determinants of investment in 
environmental R&D?" 
2016/14, García-López, M.A; Hémet, C.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Next train to the polycentric city: The effect of 
railroads on subcenter formation" 
2016/15, Matas, A.; Raymond, J.L.; Dominguez, A.: "Changes in fuel economy: An analysis of the Spanish car market" 
2016/16, Leme, A.; Escardíbul, J.O.: "The effect of a specialized versus a general upper secondary school curriculum on 
students’ performance and inequality. A difference-in-differences cross country comparison" 
2016/17, Scandurra, R.I.; Calero, J.: “Modelling adult skills in OECD countries” 
2016/18, Fernández-Gutiérrez, M.; Calero, J.: “Leisure and education: insights from a time-use analysis” 
  
 
IEB Working Papers  
2016/19, Del Rio, P.; Mir-Artigues, P.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: “Analysing the impact of renewable energy regulation on 
retail electricity prices” 
2016/20, Taltavull de la Paz, P.; Juárez, F.; Monllor, P.: “Fuel Poverty: Evidence from housing perspective” 
2016/21, Ferraresi, M.; Galmarini, U.; Rizzo, L.; Zanardi, A.: “Switch towards tax centralization in Italy: A wake up 
for the local political budget cycle” 
2016/22, Ferraresi, M.; Migali, G.; Nordi, F.; Rizzo, L.: “Spatial interaction in local expenditures among Italian 
municipalities: evidence from Italy 2001-2011” 
2016/23, Daví-Arderius, D.; Sanin, M.E.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: “CO2 content of electricity losses” 
2016/24, Arqué-Castells, P.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Banking the unbanked: Evidence from the Spanish banking 
expansion plan“ 
2016/25 Choi, Á.; Gil, M.; Mediavilla, M.; Valbuena, J.: “The evolution of educational inequalities in Spain: Dynamic 
evidence from repeated cross-sections” 
2016/26, Brutti, Z.: “Cities drifting apart: Heterogeneous outcomes of decentralizing public education” 
2016/27, Backus, P.; Cubel, M.; Guid, M.; Sánchez-Pages, S.; Lopez Manas, E.: “Gender, competition and 
performance: evidence from real tournaments” 
2016/28, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Duch-Brown, N.; García-Quevedo, J.: “Innovation strategies of energy firms” 
 
 
 
